Introduction
The recent international fight against terrorism is an illustrative example of how the citizen -used here in the broad sense of natural and legal persons, but also of entities without a specific legal status -can be confronted with sanctions at the international level because the individual is blacklisted as a terrorist and thus as a threat to international peace and security. In 1999 sanctions were announced against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and not long after this they were extended to Osama Bin Laden and AlQaida. After 11 September 2001, sanctions came into force against a motley collection of terrorists. Often the reason why the person concerned has been included on such a list is not clear and where he can successfully contest his inclusion on the list is even less so. The fact is that present international cooperation against terrorism takes place at various levels. The start of the chain of measures is usually a binding Resolution by the Security Council of the United Nations (SC-UN) adopted under Chapter VII 1 of the UN Charter (UNC). States are obliged to implement these Resolutions on the grounds of Articles 25 and 48 and, moreover, on the basis of Article 103 UNC, with priority over other international obligations not based on the UNC.
2 Consequently the European Union (EU) feels obliged to implement the UN Resolutions. To do this, it uses a mix of legal instruments that in their turn oblige its member states to implement them. The member states then ensure that there is concrete implementation with regard to the citizen in question who has been included on one list or another, if need be by amending or implementing national legislation. While further considering the mechanism of this form of combating terrorism with the weapon of targeted sanctions which are directed against individuals, the question arises whether or not this is in conflict with a number of fundamental rights . To mention a few as examples: are property rights infringed when all financial assets are frozen on the basis of such a listing? Are individuals not being hampered in the expression of their right to freedom of expression and of meeting? And what about the presumptio innocentiae if an international list published on the internet describes people as terrorists who should be punished? And what is the relationship of such a public list to the right of privacy and the protection of personal information? There will be no further discussion of these questions 3 here, but there is one possible preliminary question. Is there a possibility of contesting inclusion on a list of terrorists? Is there a court that can check the legitimacy of inclusion on the lists or compatibility with fundamental rights? Is there any form of legal procedure or remedy available to those on the lists? A description of the layered mechanism of rules in the recent fight against terrorism will follow, from the moment that the Taliban and Al-Qaida entered the spotlight and in particular from 11 September 2001. This means that an overview of the Resolutions of the UN Security Council is provided, followed by the measures to implement these resolutions which have been taken at the EU level and then by national measures. Finally, there is a discussion of the overall position of the citizen listed on one or more of the lists in any attempt to contest the listing. On the basis of the regrettably still scarce case law, we will see that problems within the sphere of legal protection arise on this point. In conclusion, I will attempt to put forward a number of possible suggestions to tackle this problem.
Combating terrorism
The fight against terrorism is not new: the first UN treaties saw the light of day in the 1960s and 1970s, in particular in connection with the then fashionable phenomenon of hijacking 4 and hostage-taking, including diplomats 5 . In Europe the phenomenon was also known: many countries which are now members of the European Union have known the phenomenon of terrorism for decades. In the 1970s and even up to today, they had to contend with terrorist organisations. Great Britain had the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Germany the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), Italy the Brigate Rosse and Spain the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), to quote only the best known examples. At the national level, these countries have taken certain measures, usually by implementing special anti-terrorism legislation in an attempt to cope with the problem. There was also some form of European cooperation. In this connection, it is very much with a view to the fight against terrorism that the forerunner of the third pillar of the European Union was set up, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs: the TREVI group set up in 1975. The ministers of home affairs of the EC member states regularly came together in this forum in an intergovernmental connection. Within the Council of Europe terrorism was also an issue and in 1977 an anti-terrorism treaty was signed. 6 Other bodies were (and are still?) involved in combating terrorism in an intergovernmental way, such as the Berne Club, the Kilowatt group and the Vienna group. 7 Since the activities of Al-Qaida became a problem, in particular for the United States (US), a great deal of activity has been taking place worldwide in the field of the fight against terrorism. The US is taking a lead here and in a not too modest way: it is the war on terrorism. In its own country, legislation was sharpened in relation to crimes of terrorism, the most noticeable of which was the introduction of the Patriot Act 8 which will no doubt be followed by an even more restrictive Patriot Act II 9 , but this is certainly not a unique example. 10 The Americans are equally not shy of 'stimulating' anti-terrorism measures in other countries. The European Union is a popular partner in the war against terrorism and, certainly under American pressure, the passport with biometric information 11 and the exchange of information on air passengers have been introduced. 12 The stamp of the US may also be discerned in the shift from imposing sanctions on States to imposing sanctions on organisations. This had already been started by President Clinton, who undertook this extension in 1995 by issuing a presidential decree (executive order) within the framework of the implementation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
13 During Clinton's administration, lists of terrorist organisations were also drawn up in the implementation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996.
14 Apparently it has also become policy that organisations under international public law, besides against States, may also order sanctions against individuals and private organisations. 15 It is nevertheless still the question whether this is an exception concerned exclusively with the fight against terrorism, because the measure has also been used to prevent civil war. A recent example is Resolution 1572 (2004) of the UN Security Council 16 and the EU Council Common Position 2004/852/CFSP, 17 drawn up for its implementation, and the proposal for a EC Regulation for the implementation of this in connection with the situation in the Ivory Coast 18 in which, besides arms embargoes, measures were also proposed which are comparable to those against the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida, namely a freezing of all financial assets of certain individuals. 19 In the definitive EC Regulation, an Annex with a list of names will be included which shall correspond to the list drawn up by the (Ivory Coast) 1572 Committee of the UN. This is the same pattern as in the fight against terrorism; sanctions are imposed by the Security Council of the UN by means of resolutions under the effect of Chapter VII of the Charter. These are then translated into Common Positions of the EU Council for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP second pillar), which further instructs the European Communities (first pillar) to recast the measures as Regulations which are then enforced against individual citizens or organisations by the EU member states.
The UN measures
At the coming into being of the recent sanctions against terrorists and in particular the freezing of financial resources, there stand, apart from an UN Treaty, 20 a number of important Resolutions of the UN Security Council accepted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and directed towards the Afghan Taliban, on the one hand, and, on the other, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida who are under their protection. 26 This obliges States to freeze all assets and other economic and financial resources of those who commit acts of terrorism or attempt to commit them or who take part in them or who facilitate the carrying out of these acts. Furthermore, States have to take steps which both forbid assets and other economic and financial resources being made available to these persons as well as other financial and allied services being provided to them. This Resolution also set up a committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which supervises compliance with the resolution, but does not itself compile lists of terrorist persons and organisations. up to date. 29 Of importance is that the Committee has drawn up its own Guideline.
Resolutions

30
The Guideline includes rules on inclusion on the list (Article 5), revising the list (Article 6), but also on the delisting of persons or entities so that a possible wrongful inclusion can be rectified (Article 7). This delisting procedure can be initiated by a State whose nationality the person involved possesses or where he is resident. Names are placed on the list on the basis of relevant information (Article 4b, 5a and 5d). If possible, this should be accompanied by a description of the information which justifies the imposition of a sanction on the basis of the Resolutions (Article 5b ), together with relevant and specific information which simplifies the identification of those involved by the authorised authorities (Article 5c). Decision-making within the Committee is by consensus (Article 9a) and where the Committee is unanimous, the decisionmaking takes place in writing during which the members of the Committee may raise objections. Despite this in itself clear procedure, it is in the nature of things that the body's actual method of working is not particularly transparent to the outside world; one may only speculate on how inclusion on the list does in fact come about. It is not implausible that the greater part of the information is supplied by the American authorities, including the President himself, who obtain the information in their turn from the intelligence and security services or allied organisations. 
The EU measures
The European Union has not stood still and has on each occasion implemented the above UN Resolutions by, in its turn, itself taking decisions which then oblige the EU member states to take and implement measures. 32 Here the EU has been availing itself of the various legal instruments available to it under the EC Treaty and the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). 
Second pillar: Council common positions
A series of common positions came into being in the second pillar on common foreign and security policy (CFSP) 33 on the basis of Article 15 TEU -which sets out the Union's approach with regard to a certain matter of a geographic or thematic nature by which the member states must ensure that their national policy is in line therewith.
To implement Resolution 1267 (1999), the Council adopted Common Position 1999/727/CFSP on 15 November 1999 concerning restrictive measures against the Taliban.
34
Common Position 2001/154/CFSP was adopted for the implementation of UN Resolution 1333 (2000) . 35 It concerns the freezing of all financial assets of Osama Bin Laden himself and the persons and entities associated with him, namely Al-Qaida. The first Common Position makes consciously making assets available or collecting them for use in terrorist acts criminal offences, freezes assets, makes all passive or active support of terrorists punishable, refuses shelter to terrorists and those who support them, advocates effective border checks and measures against the abuse of asylum status. It may be noted here that certain aspects of this CFSP Common Position 930 are more far-reaching than UN Resolution 1373: the measures recommended in the Resolution (point 3) became compulsory under CFSP Common Position 930, and the obligation imposed on States in the Resolution to provide no form of support to terrorism (point 2 a) at all has become an obligation on individuals in CFSP Common Position 930 (Article 4). In the context of this article, CFSP Common Position 931 is interesting in that it determines that the European Community (EC) shall order the freezing of funds, financial assets or other financial resources of the persons, groups and entities listed in the Annex (Article 2). 40 The preamble makes it clear that the persons and entities mentioned on the list of the 1267 Committee of the UN, a list which, incidentally, also ap- 39 All these are the first acts meant to implement the UN Resolutions. Many more will regularly follow in order to supplement and update the 'original' ones. 40 As will be clear later, the freezing of the financial assets will not be the sanction imposed on all the persons or entities placed on this list. This provision does not provide for a specific procedure for the member states and the Council to put certain names on the list. It only sets criteria. These are broad and cryptic. This provision creates the impression that there is always a court decision as a basis, although this does not need to be exclusively a conviction. The fact that a court is involved could give some guarantee of a judicial check. Unfortunately there is no certainty of this: the Dutch government thinks, for example, that: 'the information (…) need not necessarily come from a judicial authority; information from the sphere of intelligence or investigation may be a reason for placing an organisation on the list.' According to information provided by the Dutch government, it appears that the latter is carried out by a clearing house: a confidential ad hoc forum that decides unanimously and which is made up of officials from the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and, for some member states, of representatives from the intelligence services. In this body, the member states examine whether a person and organisation is involved in terrorist activities. 55 There are no public documents which make known which procedure or procedures or which set of objective criteria is used to check the contributions of the member states 56 -should a certain procedure and criteria in fact exist. It is therefore clear that there is no guideline -at least made accessible to the public -at EU level, such as the Guidelines for the 1276 Committee, on how the clearing house operates. It is noticeable here that neither on the basis of CFSP Common Position 931 nor on the basis of EC Regulation 2580 is there any provision for a complaints or a delisting procedure in case of erroneous listing. Moreover, the EU lists may also contain the same persons, groups and entities as the list of the 1276 Commit- , no. 5, p. 9, the minister explains that the list has been unanimously adopted by the Council and that e decision-making in a confidential ad hoc European body is autonomous i.e. that there is no coercion from the United Nations. 56 It is likely that the member states put forward their own lists of terrorists whom they gladly want to see on the European lists. This is especially so for the European terrorists. In this sense the comment given by the leader of the Partido Popular Mariano Rajoy on the verdict of the court of Madrid that Segi is not a terrorist organisation part of the ETA is exemplar: "It is an terrorist organisation because the European list says so". tee (Article 1 paragraph 4 CFSP Common Position 931). They are often, in their turn, derived from the list of the executive order of the President of the United States. It is not known whether the names are indiscriminately copied or whether they are subjected to some form of review on the part of the EU. Probably the names are simply reproduced. 57 It is noticeable that the Court of First Instance considers every Decision implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001 with the updated list as a new decision because the list should be reviewed in the sense that 'in a community governed by the rule of law, it cannot be accepted that an act establishing continuing restrictive measures in respect of persons or entities could be applicable without limitation unless the institution which has promulgated them readopts them regularly following a review.' 58 But very little is known on how the lists are drawn up and reviewed. In this sense, Sison's appeals to the Court of First Instance (CFI) against the refusal of the Council to allow access to the documents which led to his inclusion on one of the EU's list could have been of great significance. But the CFI ruled that the Council was entitled on basis of Article 4(1) of Regulation 1049/2001 to refuse the disclosure, also partly, of the documents in question, including the identity of their authors or the third countries involved. The Council did not make a manifest error of assessments in refusing access to documents for reason of public security, the Court ruled. This is justified even if the requested information is necessary in order to secure Sison's right to a fair trail 59 because 'that circumstance is not relevant for the purpose of assessing the validity of the … decision refusing access.' provides that the Council is to establish, review and amend the list of persons, groups and entities to which that regulation applies. It follows that the Council, in each new act, reviews the disputed list. Secondly, such a review cannot be limited to the inclusion of new persons or entities or the removal of certain persons or entities since, in a community governed by the rule of law, it cannot be accepted that an act establishing continuing restrictive measures in respect of persons or entities could be applicable without limitation unless the institution which has promulgated them readopts them regularly following a review. The alleged terrorists who are marked with an asterisk, and therefore not subject to the effect of EC Regulation 2580 but of article 4 of CFSP Common Position 931, are terrorists 'made in the European Union'. They are all persons, organisations and entities who or which are subjects of member states of the European Union, such as Basque and Irish citizens or ETA and the IRA and various other kinds of organisations which have been qualified as 'being part of…' On one of the most recent lists, organisations have been listed whose names one would more likely expect to find in a comic book rather than on a serious list from the intelligence services.
64 By differentiating between terrorists who are subject to the effect of EC Regulation 2580 -and who are therefore included in the lists of the EC Decisions which determine to whom the Regulation applies -and between those who are only subject to the effect of Article 4 of CFSP Common Position 931, the Council creates different legal regimes for different terrorists: an EC regime (EC Regulation 2580) that provides for the freezing of the financial assets of non-EU subjects and an EU/third pillar regime (Article 4 of CFSP Common Position 931) that demands stronger cooperation between Member States when acting in criminal matters. The Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained the differentiation as follows: 65 The intriguing question is why this arrangement has been chosen or why EU terrorists may not be subject to EC Regulation 2580. The Dutch government has provided the information that this is because, according to the Legal Service of the Council, 'internal' terrorists are not subject 'to the scope of the CFSP by definition.' 66 Apparently the Legal Service regards the imposition of financial sanctions on EU subjects as 'internal policy' so that it could indeed be defended that Article 11 TEU 67 is not applicable and that the CFSP Council is therefore not authorised. 68 The Service could have reasoned differently, namely that the imposition of financial sanctions, made mandatory under UN Resolution 1373 (2001), is an obligation under international law on the grounds of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and is therefore foreign policy 'by definition', since it concerns the threat to world peace and security. Moreover, the second pillar also covers security policy and terrorism falls under this as well. 69 Whatever the case may be, because of the differentiation between terrorists, all kinds of measures to combat terrorism are applied against Europeans in a regime of stronger cooperation in criminal matters and not 'just' the -in the words of the Minister -freezing of financial assets under administrative law in accordance with EC Regulation 2580, which is in itself not a soft measure, and one may very well wonder if it is not punitive in character and is then subject to the effect of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The way in which 'Article 4 cooperation' must be given shape is partly determined by a separate decision of the JHA Council, Decision 2003/48/JHA. 70 This decision provides in particular for the exchange of information in the broadest sense (including files and evidence which has been seized) between the Member States among themselves, on the one hand, and between the Member States and Europol and Eurojust, on the other. 71 Moreover, in accordance with this Decision, joint investigation teams should also be set up.
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CFSP Common Position 931 has created a distinction between European and nonEuropean terrorists: they are affected by other sanctions and are subject to different legal regimes, with different outcomes where legal protection is concerned, as will be shown. In practice the distinction is not that black and white. According to international law there is nothing to stop States, apart from their membership of the EU and therefore apart from being bound by EU rules, from implementing the UN Resolutions which provide for the freezing of financial assets. Even more so, they are bound 66 Wijziging van de Sanctiewet, TK 2001-2002, 28251, no. 5 p. 10 (Amendment of the Sanctions Act). 67 Article 11 (1) paragraph 1 TEU begins with: 'The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy , the objectives of which shall be: ….' 68 See also Bulterman, M., De financiële strijd tegen het terrorisme en de mensenrechten, NJCM-Bulletin 2002, no. 7, pp. 834-848; and especially p. 837. She considers the objectives of Art. 11 TEU to be so broad that the narrow view held by the legal service is difficult to understand. 69 According to Cameron the reason for the distinction between EU and not-EU terrorists lies in the wording of Article 301 TEC: 'Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures…' The term 'third countries' might', according to Cameron, 'be stretched to cover the freezing of the property of individuals who are not EU nationals, but not that it is going too far to let this cover even EU nationals. ' to do this by the UN Charter. This means that the 'Article 4 CFSP Common Position 931-EU-terrorists' can also be the subject of financial freezing. In addition, there is nothing to stop the Member States, here again apart from their membership of the EU, from dealing with persons, organisations and entities who or which they regard as terrorists under criminal law, so that the 'Regulation 2580-non-EU-terrorists' applies, and who have been subject to financial freezing, so that they may also be subject to criminal prosecution. And even within the EU context, the strict division imposed by CFSP Common Position 931 may be put into perspective, so that EU Member States may also instigate criminal prosecutions against 'Regulation 2580-non-EU-terrorists' who are subject to the freezing of financial assets, since the CFSP does not exclude this. Inversely, that is allowing EC Regulation 2580 to be also applicable to the only 'Article 4 CFSP-931-EU terrorists' seems more difficult to defend in my view, although the Netherlands, for example, has done this. By ministerial regulation, 73 There would be nothing wrong in the implementation of the UN Resolution but to declare the EC Regulation applicable to persons, organisations and entities from which in my opinion they are explicitly excluded -on the grounds of CFSP Common Position 931 and the Decisions with lists annexed to EC Regulation 2580 -and with this extending the scope of the Regulation is a power which in my view a national minister does not possess. From Article 2 in conjunction with Article 1 paragraph 6 CFSP Common Position 931 and Article 2(3) EC Regulation 2580 it cannot otherwise be deduced, in my opinion, than that only the Council is authorised to compile the lists and in doing so to determine to whom the measures apply. 
The national measures
The UN Member States are bound to implement the decisions of the UN Security Council taken under Chapter VII. In addition, these same states, being at the same time Member States of the EU, are also bound to implement the appropriate regulations and to implement the JHA decisions and framework decisions. 75 The Common Positions adopted in the second CFSP pillar are also not without obligations, since 73 Article 15 TEU instructs the Member States to ensure national compliance with the policy laid down in the common positions in relation to a specific subject.
Financial sanctions
In order to fulfil the above international obligations, the Member States had either to implement national legislation or to amend already existing national legislation or to apply regulations. 76 In the Netherlands in 2000, in the implementation of various UN Resolutions on sanctions and EC Regulations concerned with these that do not in themselves relate to terrorism, the Sanctions Act (Sanctiewet), the Import and Export Act (In-en uitvoerwet [IUW] ) and the Economic Offences Act (Wet op de economische delicten [WED]) were amended. 77 The Sanctions Act was again amended in 2002 after the UN Resolutions and the ditto EC Regulations which arrange for the freezing of the financial assets of the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida and in implementation of the 11 September Resolution 1373 (2001) and the matching EU measures. 78 Orders in council and numerous ministerial regulations have been repeatedly attached to the law; they adapt the implementation to changing circumstances and they are moreover applicable to new terrorists who are added to the various international lists on each occasion. Committee of the UN placed Aden, with two other natural persons and one organisation, on the list of people and entities against whom financial sanctions were to be ordered. As a result of this, they were also placed on the list of EC Regulation 2199 and then, on the basis of this, their financial assets were frozen by the Swedish authorities. Aden et al pleaded that the Council had exceeded the limits of its allotted powers under Arts. 60 and 301 EC and was acting in contravention of Article 249 EC because the Council is not authorised to order sanctions against private individuals. They complain about a lack of legal protection; infringement of the legal principle of the right to a fair and equitable hearing and express their doubts as to the soundness of the imposition of the sanctions. 88 Moreover, in the meantime, two of the three people who were taking legal action in Aden et al have been scrapped from the 1267 Committee list due to an application for delisting by the Swedish state, which has apparently been honoured. The organisation puts forward the argument that it is suffering damage by the stigmatisation which is a result of its being listed as a terrorist organisation while it is in fact dedicated to promoting democracy in Iran. In the view of the organisation, being put on the list without being heard is in conflict with the rights of defence and is a violation of the right to resist tyranny and oppression, as a higher legal rule. The Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) an umbrella organisation made up of different Kurdish organisations brought two actions. In the first 93 The KNK is seeking annulment because the inclusion of the PKK on the 'terrorist' lists discredits the struggle of the KNK 'to strengthen the unity and cooperation of the Kurds.' Because the PKK was already disbanded when its was listed it is the KNK that challenges the listing. The Court dismissed the application as inadmissible because the contested decision is not addressed to the applicant since the KNK itself is not named on the list. Furthermore, the court stated, according to the case-law an association formed for the promotion of collective interests of a category of persons, as is the case with the KNK, cannot be considered to be individually concerned and is therefore not entitled to bring an action for annulment. In the second action 94 The applicants submit that the Council breached the EC Treaty because it failed to apply accessible, objective criteria to the correct facts; failed to give the applicants an opportunity to make representations prior to the proscription and/or to provide the applicants a fair hearing an/or an effective remedy by which to challenge the factual assertions relied upon by the Council; failed to provide accurate or adequate reasons as to the legal and factual basis of its decision; failed to respect fundamental rights as Articles 10 and 11 and Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR; breached the principles of Community law such as proportionality, certainty, equality and the right to a fair hearing and that it misuses power. Sison has instituted a number of legal proceedings 98 but they amount to the fact that he is contesting EC Regulation 2580/2001, on the one hand, and the decisions linked thereto with the lists on which his name is repeatedly mentioned, because he is included on these lists 99 and, on the other hand, a number of decisions of the Council in which he is denied access to the documents which underlie these decisions, or in other words, the files which form the basis for his inclusion on the lists. It cannot be accepted that a legal person who had ceased to exist, assuming that is so, may validly appoint a representative.' (Order CFI, Case T-229/02, § 37). 96 It is worthy to mention that in this regard the Court established explicitly that a person, organisation or entity named on the lists of the Decisions implementing art. 2(3) of Regulation 2580 is to be regarded as being directly and individually concerned, Order CFI, Case T-229/02, § 27. That means that the action for annulment of the regulation brought by someone named on this lists cannot be considered inadmissible for not fulfilling that criterion. 97 
Sanctions under criminal law
Segi
Segi and Gestoras pro Amnistía are two Spanish Basque youth organisations which are described on the list of CFSP Common Position 931 as 'being part of' the ETA and marked as EU-terrorists. In February 2002, when they already appeared on the list, they were declared illegal by a judicial order and twelve of their committee members were put behind bars for being part of ETA and because of other terrorist activities. Both organisations have commenced an action for damages at the Court of First Instance against their inclusion on the CFSP Common Position 931 list and have lodged a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR).
The judgment of the Court of First Instance
The Court has delivered its judgment in the Gestoras pro Amnistía 102 and Segi 103 cases. Segi's action for damages is directed at CFSP Common Position 931 and the following updated common positions because the lists keep including its name and therefore they are the basis for the damage it has suffered. The Court regards itself as being incompetent to deliver a judgment on this because it has no jurisdiction over the second pillar and therefore it is not in a position to consider CFSP Common Position 931 and its updatings. Neither has it, on the basis of Article 35 TEU, any jurisdiction within the third pillar to determine the legality of a common position under Article 34 TEU that forms the legal basis of Article 4 of CFSP Common Position 931 which Segi falls under. Neither can the Court rule on a claim for damages because Article 35 TEU provides for no such possibility, according to the Court. Segi suspected all this and indeed argues that the Council has exceeded its Community powers by taking measures on the basis of the CFSP and JHA pillars so that as much as possible could be arranged outside the democratic control and jurisdiction of the Community courts since: just as the Court is not competent to rule, neither is the European Parliament authorised to express its view concerning the second pillar nor concerning common positions in the third pillar. Segi describes the choice of juristic acts in the '27 December package' as fraudulent. According to the Court, this is not the case because the procedure followed by the Council and the choice of legal instruments fits within the system of the division of powers. It must be admitted that the Court is right here, although Segi's suspicion is understandable. Whether the Council has intentionally chosen the construction and, specifically, the CFSP/JHA construction against European terrorists cannot be proven, partly because of the lack of documents and preparatory documents available to the public. But the construction makes it painfully clear how the pillar system offers the possibility of taking stringent measures against citizens without democratic legitimacy and without the possibility of scrutiny by a Community court. And this is in particularly sensitive areas -terrorism, crime fighting, po-lice cooperation -where the rights of citizens can be substantially affected so that gaps in legal protection and in democratic legitimacy become all the more problematic.
The Court also argues that Segi has no chance of success with an action for damages in the national courts: 'it would not be to its advantage to invoke the individual responsibility of every Member State for the measures adopted for the implementation of CFSP Common Position 931.' It would be just as pointless, in the opinion of the Court, to bring such an action because of the responsibility of each member state on account of its part in EU decision-making. Moreover, the Court continues, and correctly, the route to the Community courts via the national courts is also closed because the latter cannot ask for preliminary rulings in this case (Article 234 EC). It is not able to do this on account of Article 46 TEU concerning the second pillar and is also not able to do this on account of Article 35(1) TEU concerning the common positions in the third pillar. The Court draws the conclusion that applicants very probably do not have any effective legal protection: nor at the Community Courts nor at the national courts regarding the listing. 104 The Court provides no grounds as to why the action for compensation in the national court would stand no chance of succeeding. Regarding Segi, the court in Madrid dismissed the charges against members of Segi (and other organisations) accused of membership of ETA. 105 The court found that those organisations, although found guilty of many illegal activities, are not, according to the criteria established by the Spanish High Court, terrorist groups nor part of ETA. The case is not definitively decided because the prosecution has announced to appeal the verdict. 106 If up to the last instance the result should be the same, i.e. that Segi is not considered a terrorist organisation nor part of ETA while it is listed as such, what then? Couldn't Segi start an action for compensation of damage against the Spanish State -if, of course, such an action is possible according to the Spanish juridical system -for his responsibility in the Council's decision to place Segi on the EU-list on which it is mentioned and described as being 'part of the terrorist group ETA'? 107 How can the organisation than challenge this wrongful listing? Or will than rise a problem about de definitions of 'terrorist'? This are difficult questions. The cause of all problems is the fact that an individual is included on a list of terrorists and that on account of this listing he is subject to concrete measures. It is the very inclusion on the lists that sets off the sanction mechanism against the individual. This is where the wrongfulness lies according to Segi and this is what causes it damage. The reasoning of the Court of First Instance for ascertaining a lack of national legal protection, at any rate in so far as damages are concerned, is possibly based on the fact that the Court of Justice of the EC (ECJ) as-sumes that the national courts are not competent to make pronouncements on the validity or the legality of acts of EC institutions (Foto-Frost).
108 This is what the courts would have to do if they wish to pronounce on the liability of the implementing Member State; after all, the claimant's inclusion on the list is said to be unlawful and this is an act of the Council. Should this be the reasoning followed by the CFI, then the question arises whether it also applies in this case. The reasoning in Foto-Frost, that the ECJ has exclusive jurisdiction to deliver a judgment on the legitimacy of acts of EC institutions, is particularly inapplicable in this case. The Council's decisions are based on the second and third pillar and the CFI, after all, does not have the competence for the above-mentioned reasons. If EU terrorists were hit by criminal measures because of their inclusion on the CFSP Common Position 931 list, the situation would be no different. The national courts might also not determine the legitimacy of the second and third pillar acts of the Council -that is, including the person or persons concerned on the list -which forms the basis of the steps taken under criminal law. Neither may the criminal courts put preliminary questions to the Community courts. Moreover the Council takes unanimous decisions to get someone on the list so all member states are responsible. It is therefore not completely clear what the role of the national courts is in this complicated context. In the meanwhile Segi appealed at the ECJ against the order of the CFI 109 so we have to wait for the view of the ECJ which hopefully will clarify some points.
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights
Moreover, Segi and Gestoras pro Amnistía have also lodged a complaint with the ECrtHR against the 15 EU member states that have put them on the CFSP Common Position 931 list. 110 They argue that Articles 6 (fair trial), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of assembly and association) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the ECHR have been violated. The Court considered the complaint to be inadmissible because, in short, Segi is not entitled to the status of a victim solely on the basis of the fact that it has been included on the list of terrorists: there has to be a concrete violation of human rights; it is not possible to lodge a complaint in abstracto or an actio popularis. This listing 'may be embarrassing' (peut être gênant), but it is not contrary to the ECHR, in the view of the Court. Article 4 of CFSP Common Position 931, under which Segi falls, creates no new powers for the member states, according to the Court, but only obliges them to intensify their international cooperation, which is also provided for in other treaties and agreements, without creating legal obligations to the disadvantage of the applicants. In other words, inclusion on the list has no legal effects. According to the Court, any measures taken against Segi, whether by the EC or by the national authorities, are subject to scrutiny by the courts. The Court pointed out the possibility of successful legal action in the Community courts, partly in the light of Jégo-Quéré. This was a mistaken assessment, as appeared from the Segi judgment of the CFI itself.
111 Because of this, the ECrtHR did not examine the matter which Segi put forward: that no legal remedies were available to it to contest its inclusion on the list. And this is where the shoe pinches, as appears from the judgment of the CFI. It is certainly the case that inclusion on the list is 'embarassing' but whether it has no legal effects is still the question. After all, measures are taken against a certain individual because of her very inclusion on the list: it is the specific intention that the State imposes sanctions on this particular individual and not on someone else. In my view, the Member States are most certainly obliged to act against those who have been included on the list. The imposition of the measures in themselves, for example being arrested for committing terrorist crimes, may indeed be subject to scrutiny by the national courts, but it is disputable whether the fact that they have been imposed on the person concerned because this person has been included on the list, which therefore implies a judgment concerning the placing on the list, could be examined by the national courts. It is the case, however, that should national legal remedies be exhausted in, for example, a criminal procedure on account of terrorism, Segi could yet complain in Strasburg on account of the violation of a number of fundamental rights if that should be the case. The inclusion on the list can then once again be raised as an alleged violation in itself. This possibility is not merely theoretical if the ruling of the Spanish court in first instance that Segi is not a terrorist organisations nor part of ETA would be held also by the highest court.
Is there sufficient legal protection?
From the Segi judgments it appears that, at any rate for EU terrorists, problems concerning legal protection arise insofar as inclusion on the list is concerned. The ECrtHR regards the applicants as having no cause of action; the national courts are not competent in the eyes of the CFI, like the Community courts themselves. The CFI in Segi does not rectify this gap and appeals to case law 112 to state that a lack of legal protection does not in itself grant autonomous power; there is no reason to tamper with the division of power such as that which is laid down in the legal system of the Community. The Court does not examine a possible solution for the shortcoming which has been ascertained. Apparently the Court remains true to the UPA line 113 in the sense that it is the task of the Member States to find a solution here. It is however the question whether this reasoning holds true in this case, because a Catch 22 situa- tion in the legal protection has developed here exactly because of the interaction of EC law (first pillar) and EU law (second and third pillar), and therefore precisely because the entire EC-EU system concerning the court's jurisdiction has created this gap and not so much the possible shortcomings in national procedural laws. The question which then arises is whether making skilful use of the powers in the first, second and third pillar, with the result that scrutiny by the courts, including that of the national courts, is not possible, may result in citizens not having legal protection concerning their inclusion on the lists. Is it not defensible to argue that in such a situation the national courts must fill this gap and determine the lawfulness of being placed on the list? 114 There are more reasons for advocating a role for the national courts in this matter, apart from that of the lack of legal protection. First, because citizens are being severely affected in their fundamental rights and the Court of First Instance, as is apparent from the Segi judgment, is not competent to examine the fundamental rights on the basis of Article 6 paragraph 2 EU because, again, acts of the second and third pillar are excluded from this scrutiny. Second, because the legal instruments applied by the Council have hardly been subject to democratic checks and approval. 115 Third, because CFSP Common Position 931 (and also EC Regulation 2580 and the annexes with Decisions with lists) provide for no form of internal legal procedure at all. For example, there is no delisting procedure provided which would make it possible for the person or organisation concerned to submit a request to the Council for removal from the list. Such a procedure does exist, for example, in connection with the list of terrorists drawn up by the UN 1276 Committee. 116 This kind of procedure is not a replacement for full and effective legal protection by an impartial and independent court, but at least it offers the person involved the possibility of defending himself and of having any mistakes rectified. The Segi decision has also made it clear that the information given by the Dutch government to Parliament is only a half-truth. When the Minister for Foreign Affairs soothes the members of parliament as follows: 'persons involved can always defend themselves against being placed on the list by the court in (sic) first instance' 117 , according to the Court itself, this does not apply in any case to the European terrorists who are listed on the CFSP Common Position 931 list and its updates.
For non-European terrorists, there is another legal regime -at any rate on the basis of the system elaborated in CFSP Common Position 931 -that offers more rays of hope from the point of view of legal protection. Because they fall within the scope of EC Regulation 2580, they can -and as we have seen some of them have already done soappeal for the nullification of this regulation at the Community courts. How these 114 See also: Claes M., The National Courts' Mandate in the European Constitution, dissertation Maastricht, pp. 499 and 578-579. 115 Because of the chosen kinds of acts and the legal basis of the '27 December set' only EC Regulation 2580 had to be submitted to the European Parliament for consultation. The latter expressed concern about the spreading of measures among the three pillars, but this did not influence the decision-making at all. courts will judge on admissibility and on the application would require a crystal ball, not in the last place because of the political sensitivity of the subject of terrorism. On the basis of EC Regulation 2580, the financial assets of these persons or of these organisations must be frozen by the national authorities. Lifting or 'defreezing' can be applied for on the basis of Articles 5 and 6 of the regulation, respectively. This is, in any case in the Netherlands, an administrative law procedure to which an objection and an appeal are open if there is a rejection. 118 Here again the question remains whether the national administrative courts can decide on the legitimacy of inclusion on the list of EC decisions which are linked to the regulation, if the applicant contests this listing. 119 In this case the Foto-Frost formula would certainly hold true, since the ECJ or the CFI has the exclusive power to determine this, and the national courts would not be allowed to do so. But this court can put preliminary questions to the European Court of Justice.
UN, EU and human rights
In the question of the fight against terrorism, a particular factor plays an important but also a complicating role, namely that of the tension between complying with obligations under public international law such as implementing UN Resolutions of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII and at the same time respecting human rights as embedded in national constitutions and other international treaties, for example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ECHR. 120 This tension occurs in particular when the UN imposes sanctions not on States but on persons and organisations and when the UN also indicates on certain lists the persons against whom the sanctions should be imposed. The courts can examine whether the sanctions in themselves may contain a violation of human rights or whether they are to be applied in conformity with the requirements of human rights. But the question of whether placing persons on the list could in itself imply a violation is a more complicated matter. Access to the courts to contest such resolutions or lists by the Security Council of the UN, for example, is impossible for private individuals. The European Court of Justice is reserved where the examination of UN sanctions on human rights is concerned. In the Bosphorus case, 121 the Court deemed the objective of the sanctions imposed by the UN Resolutions of the Security Council to be of such fundamental public interest for the international community that restrictions on individual fundamental freedoms may be justified. It here concerned the seizure by the Irish authorities -on account of sanctions against Serbia during the Balkan war -of an aircraft which was the property of an Yugoslavian airline company. This aircraft had been leased to and used by a Turkish charter company before the sanctions were announced; this charter company had been acting entirely in good faith. In the same case now the ECrtHR ruled on account of the stated violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR (protection of property). 122 The ECrtHR is equally prudent when it comes to relations under public international law but at the same time makes clear that compliance with legal obligations flowing from international organisations is justified as long as the organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights in a manner which can be considered 'at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides.' Equivalent does not mean identical but comparable, because require an identical standard could run counter to the interest of the international co-operation pursued. Equivalent protection relates to the means of control and not to its result. If equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State complies with the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation, 'however, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient.' If this should be the case than 'the Convention's role as a "constitutional instrument of European public order" in the field of human rights will outweigh the interest of international cooperation.' 123 The Court established in this specific case that the EC was presumed to give equivalent, not manifestly deficient protection. Important is that again the ECrtHR emphasises that member states must comply with the rights protected by the Convention and that the control on respecting them is essential. This implies that member states must also protect the right of access to court. In this respect the ECrtHR held in Waite and Kennedy, 124 that this right is not an absolute one and that limitations are possible, in particular in relations under public international law where the immunity of States and international law organisations play a role. The right of access to the courts yields when the international organisation in question has an adequate internal procedure which offers the applicant the possibility to defend his rights. 125 But at the same time the ECrtHR has also stated:
The 125 '…Taking into account in particular the alternative means of legal process available to the applicants, it cannot be said that the limitation on their access to the German courts with regard to ESA impaired the essence of their "right to a court" or was disproportionate for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.' ( § 73 The same appears in the Matthews case:
126 States must comply with their obligations on human rights in accordance with ECHR -thus also the right to an effective legal remedy (Article 13) or fair trial (Article 6) -even when they have transferred certain powers to organisations under public international law such as by the EC Treaty. This fits in very well with the situation that EU bodies implement UN Resolutions, the member states have to implement both and the citizen is affected. UN Resolution 1373 (2001), which CFSP Common Position 931 is intended to implement, has no remedy procedure simply because no list of terrorists is attached to UN Resolution 1373 (2001), unlike Resolution 1267 (1999). In this case, it is left to the States to decide against whom the financial sanctions will be imposed and this offers the member states a discretionary scope to compose the list. This is also true when the States work together in the EU context. Then the Member States in a EU connection assess, it is hoped, the balance of the general security interest and of individual fundamental rights. But that is not enough in my view. This same discretionary power offers in my view sufficient scope to develop legal procedures at both the national level as well as in a EU connection where those involved can put forward their defence. In the light of the case law this would not be excessive.
Since 11 September 2001, alertness to terrorist activities has not diminished and at all levels from the UN to regional organisations to individual States, all kinds of measures have been taken to prevent and to punish terrorism. One can wonder here whether there is still a balance between security and the observance of human rights. 127 It is difficult to avoid the impression that security at this moment takes great priority, and rightly so, but that human rights objections are being brushed aside as bothersome. 128 That terrorism and terrorists must be combated is beyond dispute, and it is evident that the right of the individual might sometimes have to give way to the interest in the security of the many. This must not lead, however, to the idea taking hold that without human rights, security is guaranteed, because even the most atrocious of police states where human rights and independent and impartial courts are non-existent can offer its citizens total security. In the Tinnelly case 130 also, where the Northern Ireland electricity company excluded certain companies from work for reasons of national security and where there was no possibility of contesting the exclusion, the Court has made it clear that the right of access to the courts may not be completely eroded for reasons of security.
'On that understanding, and having regard to the above-mentioned statement of principles (see paragraph 72 above), the Court will assess whether there existed a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the concerns for the protection of national security invoked by the authorities and the impact which the means they employed to this end had on the applicants' right of access to a court or tribunal.'
Conclusions
As it would appear, it is a complicated matter for the citizen who is known worldwide as a terrorist to contest the possible wrongfulness of inclusion on the list. For persons, organisations and entities included on the list of the 1276 Committee of the UN (and who incidentally may also appear on other lists) there is the possibility in any case of using a delisting procedure. No delisting procedure is available for individuals included on the EU lists (and who are not also on the UN list of the 1276 Committee), and in fact no single internal access to justice seems to exists. In addition, it is not clear which court -the national, the supranational or no single one -has the power to deliver judgment on the legitimacy of the listing. There is still the anticipation of further case law from the Court of First Instance where a number of cases are pending, possibly from the European Court of Justice and from national judge-made law to provide a better picture of this complex subject-matter. A preliminary careful conclusion based on the present state of affairs is that there is a gap in Community legal protection concerning a certain category of terrorists, that is the EU subjects if one assumes the three-pillar construction that the Council has chosen to impose measures against them. This category also emerged empty-handed from the ECrtHR with their complaint that inclusion on the EU list of CFSP Common Position 931 could in itself be said to imply a violation of a number of fundamental rights. No matter what the case may be, juridical problems occur with this layered structure of targeted sanctions directed at individuals giving, for the very reason that the sanctions are directed at persons/organisations, an extra dimension to the problematic nature of the commitment of organisations under public international law to respect human rights.
At the EU level, part of the solution lies with the Council itself. As a first step, the Council could bring about a change in the obscure way in which persons, organisations and entities are placed on the lists. Its own internal guideline, which of course would also be public, would be of help here. This could also be useful for the body that decides who is put on the list so that they can check the 'wish lists' of the Member States or of other bodies. The guideline must include as many objective criteria as possible for the assessment, in order to prevent as much arbitrariness as possible on the part of the member states and a too enthusiastic trust in the soft information from the intelligence services. Insofar as this is the case, there must be a restriction on the unquestioning adoption of names from the lists of the US presidential executive orders and from the lists of the 1276 Committee. As a second step, a delisting procedure should be introduced at the Union level. The member states and the Council are not infallible and certainly not where soft and very soft information from the intelligence services is concerned. Stringent requirements may also be made concerning the delisting procedure, considering the important public interest which is at stake here. That terrorism must be fought is not disputed, in fact, but this does not release international organisations and national authorities from their responsibility towards respecting the right to a form of legal proceeding or of access to the courts. It seems that the Council is slowly beginning to realise that one or two matters in connection with the lists are legally not entirely flawless:
'…freezing as a preventive measure, targeting terrorist individuals and groups, has led to a series of legal questions. These questions range from the criteria which should be applied and the evidence which is needed for administrative freezing, the relation of administrative freezing to judicial freezing, seizure and confiscation, to matters of due process, availability of delisting procedures and the role of intelligence in the designation process. These questions need to be further studied, including the question as to the limits of the powers of the Community and the Union to act in these areas. Further improvements to the designation process will be considered.' 131 If it were to appear definite that there was no legal procedure and also no legal examination possible at both EU level and national level because of the mutual demarcation of competences, then a plea for a place for the national courts is justified. The national courts would have to look for openings in order to make pronouncements in a procedure on the legitimacy of including the litigant concerned on a terrorist list. The national courts will be inclined to exercise extreme restraint when confronted with both UN decisions and EU decisions and certainly on such a delicate subject-matter. It may be admitted that it is not an easy task, but the not unimaginable possibility that people who are listed worldwide on public lists as a terrorist danger with the intention of inflicting heavy sanctions on them, without their having a possibility of defending themselves against this inclusion, is even less of an attractive option. Not attractive because the danger of arbitrariness on the part of states is approaching too closely.
